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SPLITTING THE HORNS OF  
EUTHYPHRO’S MODAL RELATIVE
Chris Tweedt
There is a modal relative of Euthyphro’s dilemma that goes like this: are 
necessary truths true because God affirms them, or does God affirm them 
because they’re true? If you accept the first horn, necessary truths are as con-
tingent as God’s free will. If you accept the second, God is less ultimate than 
the modal ontology that establishes certain truths as necessary. If you try to 
split the horns by affirming that necessary truths are somehow grounded in 
God’s nature, Brian Leftow meets you with an argument. I will argue that 
Leftow’s argument fails and that, contrary to his argument, there is a good 
reason to believe that necessary truths are grounded in God’s nature.
Introduction
There is a modal relative of Euthyphro’s dilemma that goes like this: are 
necessary truths true because God affirms them, or does God affirm them 
because they’re true? If you accept the first horn, necessary truths are as 
contingent as God’s free will. If you accept the second, God is less ultimate 
than the modal ontology that establishes certain truths as necessary. If 
you try to split the horns by affirming that necessary truths are somehow 
grounded in God’s nature, Brian Leftow meets you with an argument.1 
I will argue that Leftow’s argument fails and that, contrary to his argu-
ment, there is a good reason to believe that necessary truths are grounded 
in God’s nature.
Leftow’s Argument
A deity theorist holds that God’s nature makes true all necessary truths, 
even those necessary truths that are about creatures only. For example, 
God’s nature makes the following creature-only truth necessary:
(WATER): Water = H20.
To deity theorists, all necessary truths have a truthmaker or truthmakers—
entities in virtue of which truthbearers are true—that is/are grounded in 
God’s nature, or deity. There are many varieties of deity theories. A deity 
theorist could hold that each necessary truth has a truthmaker and that 
1Brian Leftow, “Against Deity Theories,” in Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion, ed. 
Jonathan Kvanvig (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 105–160. 
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all of these truthmakers are contained in God’s nature. Or a deity theorist 
could hold that all necessary truths have one truthmaker that is identical 
to God’s nature. There are other possibilities. No matter what the version 
of deity theory, Leftow argues that the deity theorist must make an unde-
sirable commitment. Here’s Leftow’s argument.2
(1) Deity theories commit us to the claim that God’s existence depends on 
there being truthmakers3 for particular necessary truths about creatures 
only.
(2) Theories that did not so commit us would ceteris paribus be preferable.
(3) So, it would be preferable ceteris paribus to avoid a deity theory.
I’ll argue against premise (2) in this paper, but premise (2) contains 
reference to the commitment mentioned in premise (1). So, I’ll briefly give 
Leftow’s argument for this commitment, then I’ll give Leftow’s arguments 
for premise (2).
The undesirable (to Leftow) commitment deity theorists make is that 
God’s existence depends on there being truthmakers for particular truths 
about creatures only. Leftow argues using (WATER) as an example:4
(4) If (WATER) is untrue, then nothing has deity.
(5) If nothing has deity, then God does not exist.
(6) So, if (WATER) is untrue, then God does not exist.
Leftow has arguments for these premises that I will not present here. 
I should, however, say something about (4), because Leftow will use 
premises just like (4) to argue for (2). Although the antecedent of (4) is 
necessarily false, Leftow believes that we don’t have substantive reasons 
for inferring that something does have deity from < (WATER) is untrue >. 
For semantic reasons, when antecedents are impossible, the conditional 
is true—but only for semantic reasons. Leftow is not concerned with se-
mantics alone. Leftow says that, given a deity theory, we ought rather 
(or also) to accept (4) for reasons of substantive ontological dependence. 
If (4) is considered as a matter of substantive ontological dependence, 
(4) is true, and a conditional with (4)’s antecedent but with < something 
does have deity > as its consequent can be ignored as it pertains to his 
argument.5 The same comments (mutatis mutandis) apply to (6), where the 
antecedent is also necessarily false.
2Ibid., 110. 
3Leftow uses the plural here, but it is evident that he thinks his argument would work 
just as well against someone who holds that there is just one truthmaker for all necessary 
truths. 
4I’ve abridged Leftow’s argument, excising portions of the argument that are unim-
portant for this paper’s purposes while still leaving the essence of his argument intact. The 
argument is in “Against Deity Theories,” 111.
5“But even if all such conditionals are trivially true for semantic reasons, some may also 
reflect important facts: truths can be overdetermined to be true. I argue below that on a 
SPLITTING THE HORNS OF EUTHYPHRO’S MODAL RELATIVE 207
Suppose you accept (6) and also accept (1). ([1] is the principle of which 
[6] is an example.) What’s so bad about that? Enter premise (2): theories 
that did not so commit us would ceteris paribus be preferable. Leftow gives 
four arguments for premise (2). I will argue against these arguments in 
the next section.
Leftow’s first argument is as follows: if deity theory were true, we 
would have to accept a (non-semantic) connection between the antecedent 
and consequent of: if (WATER) is untrue, then God does not exist. However, 
(WATER)’s having a truth value seems to have nothing to do with whether 
God exists. If a conditional’s antecedent is intuitively irrelevant to its con-
sequent, we should reject the conditional for all but semantic reasons.6
If (WATER) is false, then God does not exist
seems just as unconnected as
Were Louis XV King of France, watched pots would seldom boil.7
Leftow supports the non-connection between (WATER)’s truth value and 
God’s existence by giving an analogy to scientific theories. “Deity theories 
do not make (WATER) appear relevant to God’s existence, and lack the 
claim on our acceptance which (say) a well-confirmed background scien-
tific theory does.”8 That is, a scientific theory makes one of its applications 
appear to be relevant to its other applications. Deity theories do not. For 
example, if an apple and a rock were both to fall toward the earth, the 
apple’s falling and the rock’s falling appear to be relevant to each other. 
That is, it appears to us that these two happenings are related in such a 
way that we would be willing to accept a scientific theory (i.e., the law of 
gravity) explaining this connection. (WATER) and God’s existence do not 
appear to be relevant to each other in a way similar to the way the apple’s 
falling and the rock’s falling do.
Leftow’s second argument is similar. If a deity theory were true, de-
nial of any necessary truth would entail the denial of all other necessary 
truths, even seemingly unrelated ones. (Of course, it trivially follows for 
semantic reasons that the denial of any necessary truth entails the denial 
of any other necessary truth, but Leftow, remember, is concerned with 
substantive dependence, not just semantic dependence.) Leftow argues 
that if we deny any necessary truth, then we deny deity, and if we deny 
deity theory, [ < if (WATER) is untrue, then God does not exist > ] is such a case. It reflects a 
substantive, objectionable dependence that would exist were a deity theory true; it is not an 
oddity of conditional semantics we can just ignore. Putting this another way: we can ignore 
[ < if (WATER) is untrue, then God does not exist > ] only if the only reason we have to affirm 
it is semantic.” Ibid., 111–112. 
6Leftow says that semantic reasons are irrelevant in these cases, because he concedes 
there are only semantic reasons for accepting the conditional, not substantive reasons, 
which deity theories would provide. Ibid., 156.
7The objection starts on ibid., 155; this conditional is on p. 156. 
8Ibid., 156, emphasis his.
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deity, we deny all that deity truthmakes, which is every necessary truth.9 
Leftow gives two examples of inferences the proponent of deity theory 
must affirm.
If hydrogen contains two protons, then it is not true that 7 is prime.
If it is false that (if anything is Socrates, it is human), then it is not true that 
modus ponens is valid.
Just as in the previous argument, Leftow argues that what makes the 
antecedents true has no connection with what makes their consequents 
true: “Why should a change in chemistry mess up the numbers?”10 Leftow 
concludes that deity theories are (at best) unintuitive.11
Leftow’s third argument is that (WATER) and deity theory are explain-
able apart from each other.12 If someone were to give an account of what 
deity theory is—without mentioning that deity truthmakes (WATER)—
that person would not be providing an explanation for (WATER)’s truth. 
In fact, that person would not say anything about (WATER). However, 
if we were to accept a deity theory, we should expect that by giving an 
account of deity theory we would also be giving an account of (WATER)’s 
truth. In addition, we can give an account of water’s nature without saying 
anything about deity theory. Leftow says that if we accept deity theory, 
we would expect that in giving an account of water’s nature we would 
mention deity theory. So, deity theory and (WATER) are not related, and 
it is implausible to commit to the view that they are.
Fourth, deity is the property that makes God divine, so it should con-
tain only what is necessary for God to be divine. However, intuitively, 
(WATER) is not necessary for making God divine. If we were to list every-
thing that is true about God’s nature, arguably we would not include facts 
about water. So, deity does not contain the truthmaker for (WATER).13 
9“Deleting deity deletes all that deity contains. So if (WATER) were untrue, some truth-
makers of every necessary truth would not exist . . . if deity does not exist, nothing is left to 
truthmake anything.” Ibid., 157–158.
10Ibid., 158. 
11“If a strongly intuitive truth [a truth about truthmakers for necessary truth] generates 
unintuitive consequences when conjoined with a deity theory, this is reason to consider 
deity theories unintuitive.” Ibid., 158.
12“Necessary truth about water’s nature appears in no way shaped by the fact that it 
is written into deity. What there is to deity aside from this does not explain this’ [water’s 
nature] being just what it is, as far as we can tell. But given a deity theory, it is reasonable to 
expect such explanation and such marks.” Ibid., 156. That is, (WATER) appears in no way 
shaped by the claim that (WATER) is truth-made by deity—deity theory. Also, besides the 
claim that (WATER) is truth-made by deity, whatever there is to deity and what it truth-
makes does not appear to explain (WATER).
One anonymous referee took a different interpretation of Leftow’s quick argument here: 
deity (not deity theory) is explainable without (WATER) and vice versa. I will address this 
argument in my reply to Leftow’s fourth argument for (2). 
13“Again, deity is the property having which makes God divine. So it should contain 
just things that help make God divine. Intuitively, facts about water do not help make God 
divine . . . so, facts about water are irrelevant to the job the property deity does, and should 
not be packed into it.” “Against Deity Theories,” 156–157.
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The deity theorist, however, believes deity contains the truthmaker for 
(WATER). So, deity theories are false.
Replies to Leftow’s Arguments for Premise 2
The first argument is similar to the second. According to both of them, 
the denial of one necessary truth entails the denial of another. But these 
denials generate conditionals whose constituents seem unconnected. 
For example, if someone were to deny (WATER), he would have to deny 
God’s existence, but (WATER) and God’s existence seem unconnected. We 
should therefore reject the non-semantic connection between the ante-
cedent and the consequent of:
If (WATER) is untrue, then God does not exist.14
Similarly, we should reject the non-semantic connection between the an-
tecedent and consequent of:
If (WATER) is untrue, then 7 is not prime.
I will argue that even the propositions contained in this last condi-
tional—< (WATER) is untrue > and < 7 is not prime >—should seem con-
nected. Both are propositions whose truthmaker is grounded in deity. 
I will offer two analogies to show why these seemingly-unconnected 
propositions are in fact connected. The first is between deity theory and 
the proposition theory of meaningfulness, and the second is between 
deity theory and an axiom of possible world semantics. The first analogy 
shows that although the meaning of ‘Water is H20’ and the meaning of ‘7 
is prime’ initially seem unconnected, the proposition theory shows that 
they are connected. Similarly, the truth of (WATER) and < 7 is prime > 
seem unconnected, but deity theory shows that they are connected.
According to the proposition theory of meaningfulness, a sentence 
‘p’ is meaningful if and only if it expresses some proposition p. I will 
use the proposition theory of meaningfulness to establish the following 
conditional:
If ‘Water is H20’ is not meaningful, then ‘7 is prime’ is not meaningful.
One application of the proposition theory is: ‘Water is H20’ is meaningful 
if and only if it expresses some proposition p. Another application of the 
proposition theory is: ‘7 is prime’ is meaningful if and only if it expresses 
some proposition q. Now, let’s assume the following: if anything expresses 
a proposition, ‘Water is H20’ does. (This is the analogue of (WATER)’s 
necessity.) Further, let us assume that ‘Water is H20’ is meaningless. Given 
14This conditional may not seem unconnected to someone who thinks that God’s ex-
istence is identical to his nature (e.g., Aquinas). For this person, denying truthmakers for 
any necessary truth entails denying God’s nature, and denying God’s nature is identical to 
denying his existence. However, this response won’t do for seemingly-unconnected con-
ditionals that don’t include divine attributes, such as: if (WATER) is untrue, then 7 is not 
prime.
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proposition theory, it follows that nothing expresses a proposition. If 
nothing expresses a proposition, then ‘7 is prime’ does not express some 
proposition q. Given proposition theory, this entails that ‘7 is prime’ is 
meaningless. So, if ‘Water is H20’ is not meaningful, then ‘7 is prime’ 
is not meaningful.
The fact that ‘Water is H20’ is meaningful seems prima facie uncon-
nected to the fact that ‘7 is prime’ is meaningful unless the proposition 
theory is given to explain the connection. The meaningfulness of ‘Water is 
H20’ seems prima facie unconnected to the meaningfulness of ‘7 is prime’ 
only if we are ignorant of the proposition theory of meaningfulness. If 
we’re not ignorant of the theory, the meaningfulness of ‘Water is H20’ and 
the meaningfulness of ‘7 is prime’ should seem connected.
Here’s another example. Assume this axiom of possible world seman-
tics—call it “the possibility axiom’: p is possible if and only if p is true at 
some possible world. I will use this to establish the following prima facie 
unconnected conditional:
If it is not possible that 7 is prime, then it is not possible that President 
Obama is in China.
By the possibility axiom, it is possible that 7 is prime if and only if there 
is some possible world at which < 7 is prime > is true. Further, it is possible 
that President Obama is in China if and only if there is some possible 
world at which < President Obama is in China > is true. Let’s assume it 
is not possible that 7 is prime. Further, let’s assume: if anything is true 
at a possible world, < 7 is prime > is. It follows that nothing is true at any 
possible world. If nothing is true at any possible world, then < President 
Obama is in China > is not true at a possible world. So, it is not possible that 
President Obama is in China. So, if it is not possible that 7 is prime, then 
it is not possible that President Obama is in China. As with the previous 
example, the possibility that 7 is prime seems prima facie unconnected to 
the possibility that President Obama is in China only if we are ignorant of 
the possibility axiom.
Similarly, the truth of (WATER) seems unrelated to the truth that 7 is 
prime only if we’re ignorant of deity theory. If we’re not ignorant of deity 
theory, the truth of these propositions should seem connected. If anything 
has a truthmaker, (WATER) does.15 According to deity theory, if (WATER) 
were not true, it would not have a truthmaker, and if (WATER) doesn’t 
have a truthmaker, then deity does not exist. If deity does not exist, < 7 is 
prime > cannot have a truthmaker, either. So, if (WATER) is untrue, then 
it’s not the case that 7 is prime.
The proposition theory and possibility axiom analogies undermine 
Leftow’s scientific theory analogy. For example, it may not seem as ob-
vious to us that there is a connection between the meaningfulness of 
15That is, (WATER) is necessarily true. Leftow correctly assumes this throughout his 
essay.
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‘Water is H20’ and the meaningfulness of ‘7 is prime’ as it is that there’s a 
connection between an apple’s falling to the ground and a rock’s falling 
to the ground. However, even if the former connections don’t seem as 
obvious to us, there’s just as much of a connection between the former 
two as there is between the latter two. The same applies (mutatis mutandis) 
to the possibility axiom analogy. Now I turn to Leftow’s other arguments.
Leftow’s third argument is that (WATER) and deity theory are explain-
able apart from each other. An account of deity theory does not provide 
an explanation for (WATER), and an account of (WATER) does not men-
tion deity theory.
To reply, I’ll again use the analogy with the proposition theory of mean-
ingfulness (the possibility axiom could be used just as well). An account 
of proposition theory does not explain the meaningfulness of ‘Water is 
H20.’ In fact,
(PROP) A sentence ‘p’ is meaningful if and only if it expresses some 
proposition p
does not contain any reference to water at all. This, however, does not 
count against the proposition theory’s ability to explain why certain 
sentences (such as ‘Water is H20’) are meaningful. Proposition theory is 
presented at a level of generality that abstracts from the applications of 
the theory. That is, proposition theory is applied to explain why ‘Water 
is H20’ is meaningful, but proposition theory itself need not be explained 
by mentioning this application. The generality of the theory does not pre-
clude proposition theory from actually explaining why ‘Water is H20’ is 
meaningful. Similarly, deity theory is presented at a level of generality 
that abstracts from the applications of the theory. This does not, however, 
preclude deity theory from actually explaining why some propositions, 
such as (WATER), are true. Further, an account of the meaningfulness 
of ‘Water is H20’ does not include an explanation of proposition theory. I 
can even explain the meaningfulness of ‘Water is H20’ by saying that the 
sentence expresses some proposition p without saying (PROP).
Leftow’s last argument is that deity should contain only what is neces-
sary for God’s being divine, but, intuitively, facts about water are not nec-
essary for making God divine. So, deity does not contain the truthmaker 
for (WATER).
I’ll give three replies. First, it is not clear that it is intuitive that the truth-
maker for (WATER) is not necessary for making God divine. If the deity 
theorist doesn’t share Leftow’s intuition, the objection has no bite. If the 
deity theorist does share Leftow’s intuition, then one of my next two re-
plies should work. My second reply is similar to what I said in my reply to 
Leftow’s third argument: the description of deity that contains only what 
is necessary for making God divine is general enough so as to exclude ref-
erence to the truths it truthmakes. In giving an account of deity, we could 
even say, “Deity truthmakes all necessary truths,” without mentioning 
(WATER). This generality nevertheless entails that deity requires certain 
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necessary truths like (WATER). Similarly, in our account of what is neces-
sary to make God divine, we could say “God knows all truths” without 
mentioning facts about water, and this too (because of the factivity of 
knowledge) guarantees that deity requires certain necessary truths like 
(WATER). My third reply is that presumably if an account of deity theory 
were to include specifics about everything that makes God divine, the 
truthmaker for (WATER)—and for every other necessary truth—would be 
given in this account of deity theory.
Having responded to Leftow’s objections, I should mention that not 
only do Leftow’s arguments fail to support his premise (2)—that theories 
that do not commit us to (1) would ceteris paribus be preferable—but we 
actually have reason not to believe (2). Instead of (2), we have reason to 
believe that theories that do commit us to the position that God’s exis-
tence depends on there being truthmakers for particular necessary truths 
about creatures alone would ceteris paribus be preferable to those that do 
not. They would be preferable in the same way it is preferable for many 
philosophers of language to have a proposition theory of meaningfulness 
and for metaphysicians to have the possibility axiom: they have explana-
tory power, they avoid the shortcomings of other views, and they are 
not susceptible to the analogues of Leftow’s objections to deity theories. 
Likewise, deity theories have explanatory power, they avoid the horns of 
Euthyphro’s modal relative, and they, too, are not defeated by Leftow’s 
objections. Deity theories aren’t that bad after all.16
Baylor University
16Thank you to Jon Kvanvig, Alex Pruss, Trent Dougherty, and anonymous referees 
for offering helpful suggestions on earlier drafts of this paper, and to my colleagues who 
through discussion and comments have made this a much better paper: Karl Aho, Lindsay 
Cleveland, Brandon Dahm, J. Frank Holmes, Ross Parker, and Allison Thornton. 
